Brussels, 30 January 2026
Note for the attention of
Mr Piotr Serafin, Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration
Mr Dan Jørgensen, Commissioner Energy and Housing
Large Scale Review and urgent need of strengthening of the Commission’s Governance over Offices, Executive and Regulatory Agencies and Joint Undertakings: the Case of F4E
Through several notes ( see link ), we have repeatedly drawn attention to the need to strengthen, in an effective and visible manner, the Commission’s governance over Offices, Executive and Regulatory Agencies and Joint Undertakings (JUs).
The deep and long-standing crisis affecting F4E is a particularly striking illustration of this need. Most recently, in my note of 26 November 2025 ( link ), I highlighted the seriousness of the results of a recent staff pulse survey, which once again revealed extremely worrying trends.
We stressed that what is at stake is not only the internal functioning of F4E, but also its reputation and credibility, as well as those of the Commission itself.
In this context, we have taken note with satisfaction of the attention given to our concerns by Commissioner Serafin ( link ), whom we sincerely thank for his engagement and for his decisive impulse in ensuring that the Commission Decision on the prevention of and fight against all forms of harassment is applied, as a matter priority, to F4E, notably through the extension of the Commission Chief Confidential Counsellor’s (CCC) competence. In this regard, we would also like to convey the sincere appreciation of F4E staff for the on-site mission carried out by the Commission’ CCC.
This is only a first step and must be followed by immediate, concrete and decisive action.
The urgency is undeniable in light of the absolutely disastrous results of the latest F4E Staff (Dis)Satisfaction Survey, which has just been published, particularly as regards the near-total lack of trust in senior management leadership.
An overall satisfaction rate of only 31% for the “Senior Management Leadership” dimension already constitutes a severe warning signal. The situation is even more alarming in the Director’s and Projects Departments, where satisfaction collapses to a mere 22%. Moreover only 18% of respondents consider that decision-making within the organisation is objective and transparent.
Disastrous results of a magnitude never before recorded within any European institution or body.A detailed analysis is attached.
These results are all the more unacceptable given that they follow the suicide of our colleague and an endless succession of consultations, root cause analyses, staff surveys, pulse surveys and “expression directe” exercises, all of which clearly and repeatedly conveyed staff distress, a profound loss of confidence in senior management, and an unequivocal demand for genuine change.
The absence of any tangible improvement despite repeated survey feedback, raises serious questions about the willingness and capacity of the Leadership Team to acknowledge these concerns and to take the corrective action that staff clearly expect.
These results demonstrate, in an unequivocal manner, the severity and persistence of the crisis into which F4E has been sinking for far too long.
A crisis that also extends to operational aspects and has, most recently, prompted the Commission not to endorse the proposed budget for F4E.
A crisis that calls for an urgent and clear message of attention and direct political involvement from Commissioner Jørgensen — a message that staff, together with us, are still waiting for with growing impatience.
In this regard, we note with satisfaction that, at Commission level, our request to take the results of the Staff Survey into account in the framework of the Large-Scale Review has been accepted (link), and we would like to thank Commissioner Serafin in this respect. However, it is simply not acceptable that at F4E a continuous series of alarming staff survey results can be produced year after year, without this leading to any meaningful corrective action or improvement.
This is clearly also a governance issue that directly engages the political responsibility of the Commission: it is now firmly established that F4E and DG ENER have not been able to restore an acceptable level of functioning within an institution that is nevertheless of crucial strategic importance, given its central role in the most ambitious project currently underway, namely ITER.
The F4E Case: a symptom of a broader Commission governance failure
This situation has been made possible, in part, by a Commission governance framework that has not been commensurate with the gravity of the crisis, despite the commendable efforts of the Commission’s representative on the F4E Board, who has too often appeared to lack the necessary institutional backing. His recent retirement only exacerbates concerns and uncertainty.
The case of F4E illustrates with particular clarity the urgent need to strengthen the Commission’s governance over Offices, Executive and Regulatory Agencies and Joint Undertakings — not merely in principle, but in practice and in a manner that is visible and credible to staff.
This is the conclusion we expect to emerge from the ongoing work carried out in the framework of the Large Scale Review.
Indeed, while in the recent past we have duly acknowledged the Commission’s declared intention to strengthen governance and we have greatly appreciated the efforts undertaken by Mr Leardini and Mr Roques, whom we would like to thank once again in this regard, the reality is however that this intention has far too often remained purely rhetorical, failing to translate into concrete, effective and lasting change.
In practice, parent Directorates-General too frequently display a structural lack of engagement in the governance and management of the Agencies and Joint Undertakings for which they are formally responsible. This disengagement is particularly evident in the area of staff management, where personnel are effectively left at the discretion of Directors who are often ill-prepared for such responsibilities, lacking both a solid understanding of the institutional framework and a sufficient command of the Staff Regulations and applicable rules.
With a few notable exceptions that deserve to be acknowledged, the role played by Commission representatives on the management boards of these bodies is equally troubling. Too often, they are appointed at an insufficient level and demonstrate little more than a perfunctory interest in matters that do not fall strictly within the technical remit of the Agency or JU. Issues relating to governance, staff welfare, compliance with the Staff Regulations and respect for fundamental principles are routinely treated as secondary, if not ignored altogether.
Implementation of article 110 of the SR and the undermining of the perception of the Commission governance and authority
These shortcomings, and this visible lack of effective governance, are further compounded by the way in which Agencies and Joint Undertakings are required to adopt the rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 110 of the Staff Regulations.
What should be a straightforward and automatic application mutatis mutandis of binding Commission rules is instead frequently transformed into an excessively long, cumbersome and often confrontational process, creating the clear impression that the very applicability of these rules is open to negotiation and bargaining.
This practice directly undermines the statutory principle according to which Commission rules apply by default, save for duly justified and strictly limited exceptions.
Protection against harassment for staff in Agencies and Joint Undertakings cannot be treated as an “à-la-carte” arrangement!
Such protracted and exhausting processes — most recently illustrated by the adoption of the new Decision on the prevention of and fight against all forms of harassment — are deeply demoralising for staff. They convey, unmistakably, a lack of resolve and effective governance on the part of the Commission to assert its authority, enforce its own rules, protect the staff, and assume full responsibility for governance across Agencies and Joint Undertakings.
While purely technical adaptations could have been addressed rapidly, lengthy and painful negotiations were instead organised to overcome the predictable resistance of Agencies and JUs unwilling to accept the Commission CCC’s involvement in their staff management.
The result is that, after two years of endless discussions, the Commission now appears prepared to accept that Agencies and Joint Undertakings eventually establish their own internal (“in-house”) CCC. Yet it is widely understood that, in the eyes of staff, such a mechanism will never be perceived as offering the same level of independence and protection as the Commission CCC.
This is all the more unacceptable in the absence of any indisputable and objective criteria that could possibly justify such a derogation, which fundamentally calls into question the balance and credibility of the framework established by the new Decision.
As a consequence, the staff concerned report a strong sense of abandonment by the Commission, which has not lived up to the promises and expectations created by the adoption of the Decision.
Such an à-la-carte approach would result in an unacceptable inequality of protection for staff in Agencies and Joint Undertakings, depending on whether they are able to seek support from the Commission CCC or are confined to an internal “in-house” CCC.
Such an à-la-carte approach is all the more unacceptable given that staff representation, in all its statutory (AASC) and trade-union components, unanimously requested the extension of the Commission CCC’s competence to all Agencies and Joint Undertakings without exception, explicitly and legitimately rejecting any form of “in-house CCC” and they request that we convey their message to the Commission in a clear and forceful manner.
It is evident to all that this outcome risks discouraging staff from seeking support — an objective that some actors have openly pursued from the outset. These are the very same actors who openly boast about having forced the Commission to yield to their demands, congratulating themselves on having successfully blocked any involvement of the Commission CCC in the management of their staff.
Moreover, the attachment of such an “in-house CCC” to the management board does not provide the necessary guarantees, particularly in light of the frequent lack of interest shown by parent DGs and Commission representatives on these boards in staff management issues and in the proper application of the Staff Regulations.
We therefore strongly call on Commissioner Serafin to reconsider and reverse such an absolutely unacceptable à-la-carte approach.
Conclusion
At a time when the Commission claims to promote high standards of governance, accountability and duty of care, this disconnect between discourse and practice is no longer tenable.
Governance cannot be selective, optional or deferred. It must be exercised clearly, consistently and without ambiguity — particularly where the protection of staff and the credibility of the institutions are at stake.
This is the clear, resolute and unambiguous outcome that we expect to be firmly established as a conclusion of the Large Scale Review.
Cristiano SEBASTIANI
President
Copy:
Mr B. Seibert, Head of Cabinet of the President
Mr G. Radziejewski, Head of Cabinet; Ms A. Carrero, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Serafin
Mr M. Engell-Rossen, Head of Cabinet of Commissioner Jørgensen
Ms L. Naesager, Chief confidential Counsellor
Ms I. Juhansone, Secretary-General; Mr P. Leardini, Deputy Secretary-General
Mr S. Quest, Director-General DG HR; Mr C. Roques, Deputy Director-General; Mr C. Linder, Director F;
Ms M. Silva Mendes, Mr L. Duluc – DG HR
Ms D. Juul-Joergensen, DG ENER Director-General; Mr M. Coppola DG ENER
M. M. HUEBEL (ENER) Commission’ representative in the F4E’ Governing Board
Ms P. Rouch, Leader of workstream on Offices and agencies,
M. M. Lachaise, Director Fusion for Energy (F4E)
Mr A. Katsogiannis CSC
AASC
Staff