Brussels, 7 April 2026

Note to the attention of the F4E Governing Board

Subject:    R&D position about F4E’ analysis to the once again negative results of the 2025 Staff Engagement Survey and the “Expression directe” and our proposals of corrective actions to be put in place

Having taken note of the “Management and Governance Response to the 2025 Staff Engagement Survey and Direct Expression”, and of its frankly wholly unconvincing attempt once again to explain away the extremely negative results, once again, recorded, we consider it necessary to bring our reflections, analyses and proposals to the attention of the F4E Board, which will be called upon, inter alia, to assess those results.

On the one hand, R&D reaffirms its strong commitment to placing all its energy and expertise at F4E’s disposal, within the framework of social dialogue with F4E Director, in order to help the organisation emerge from a structural crisis that has already lasted far too long. In doing so, R&D will continue to work towards unity of action within the staff representation, in full respect of the positions of all concerned.

On the other hand, it is now clear that F4E management alone will not be capable of delivering the changes that are needed, nor of providing colleagues with the answers they deserve to the problems they have been denouncing for far too long.

This is why the Board’s direct and visible involvement is indispensable.

As we have done with the Commission (see annex), we are calling on the Board to assume its full responsibilities, because it would be irresponsible to leave F4E management alone to handle the difficulties identified.

Indeed, years of failure, the systematic disregard of survey findings, record-low levels of trust in senior management, inadequate protection of victims, endless internal investigations, and the persistent dismissal of external findings cannot simply be brushed aside by statements or promises, however carefully framed.

Without a genuine and visible change in governance, the obvious risk — if not the certainty — is that this will once again result in yet another “action plan”, adding to an already endless series of initiatives that have consistently proved wholly ineffective.

Such an outcome would be wholly irresponsible, since what is at stake goes far beyond individual responsibilities. It concerns the institutional credibility of F4E and of its Board, the credibility of the Commission, confidence in F4E’s ability to fulfil its mandate, notably with regard to ITER, and its ambition to assume an expanded role within the EU Fusion Strategy.

This is why the analysis of the results of the latest Staff Satisfaction Survey cannot be carried out in isolation from the broader context in which they arise.

I. Background

R&D, the leading trade union in the European civil service, has always firmly supported the essential role of direct staff consultations as a means of gathering colleagues’ structured views and ensuring that these are duly taken into account in the shaping of any staff policy.

In particular, R&D has consistently denounced the amateurism and carelessness too often displayed by administrations that are always eager to boast when results are positive, yet resort to increasingly unconvincing attempts at minimising or concealing the significance of negative findings.

To that end, and also in order to ensure the greatest possible consistency in the analyses produced across the different institutions, R&D Federal has relied at central level on some of the best experts in this field, so as to produce rigorous, evidence-based and scientifically grounded analyses of survey results.

These are also the experts whom we have mobilised to support us at F4E in analysing the very negative results of all the consultations carried out over the past decade.

This is precisely what we did most recently through the publication of our detailed communication following the release of the 2025 Staff Satisfaction Survey results at F4E (see annex).

Moreover, true to our consistently constructive approach, we have, on every occasion, accompanied our critical analyses with directly operational proposals, naturally based on the best practices identified in this field, including beyond the European institutions.

Indeed, it cannot be overlooked that, since 2014, F4E staff have been experiencing a steady deterioration in working conditions, characterised by persistently high workloads, insufficient staffing levels, an uneven distribution of tasks, and a growing sense of distance from Senior Management. This structural organisational dysfunction has resulted in inadequate communication and limited staff involvement in decision-making processes.

Over and over the years, F4E staff have consistently voiced their concerns through successive Staff Surveys and, more recently, through the RPS survey. Yet these repeated warning signals have not resulted in any significant or lasting change.

F4E has attempted to address these recurring difficulties through successive action plans and reorganisations without carrying out an assessment of the root causes of these risk factors.

Consequently, these measures have failed to reduce the identified risks.

On the contrary, the survey findings suggest that the core issues lie in leadership and in the lack of transparency and fairness in procedures.

Despite this context, F4E staff continue to demonstrate professionalism, commitment, and pride in their contribution to the organisation.

Today, the consequences of this inadequate management of risks over more than a decade are clearly visible.

II. Points of divergence

R&D notes a number of major contradictions and shortcomings in the interpretation of the results put forward by the F4 Management:

• Despite the extremely negative results relating to leadership, there has still not been even the beginning of a serious analysis of the issue. The acknowledged link between leadership and engagement has remained unresolved for more than ten years, despite repeated warnings from staff.
• The alleged improvement in trust in management is simply not supported by the data.
• Likewise, the equally critical findings regarding staff trust in the transparency of the procedures put in place have not been meaningfully taken into account and have instead been largely trivialised.

What is utterly unacceptable is the refusal to recognise an undeniable reality: the recurrence of the same problems since 2014 points to a structural and long-standing organisational failure that can no longer be ignored.

These repeated organisational changes, introduced without proper control or evaluation, constitute a well-established psychosocial risk factor in the empirical literature, as they generate disruption in work processes, loss of bearings, and excessive workloads.

Successive reforms and reorganisations have failed to deliver tangible results, yet no serious or transparent evaluation of those reforms has ever been provided.

These elements call into question not only the methodology used and the assessment of the reforms, but also the credibility of the current governance framework.

III. R&D analyses 

Faced with these negative results, which demonstrate a profoundly worrying continuity, once again, F4E seems to propose an approach focused primarily on organisational culture as the main response.

R&D considers that such an approach, taken in isolation, is not only insufficient, but also liable to divert attention from the employer’s responsibilities in the prevention of occupational risks.

In accordance with expert recommendations and Directive 89/391, the employer is subject to clear obligations regarding risk prevention:

“Within the framework of his responsibilities, the employer shall take the measures necessary for the safety and health protection of workers (…) and shall ensure that these measures are adapted to take account of changing circumstances and aim to improve existing situations.”

In this context, and as R&D has repeatedly underlined, any action or reform must, in accordance with recognised practice, be preceded by a thorough assessment of occupational risks.

A. Occupational risk factors

• 1. Leadership: very worrying results

Most strikingly, leadership, at 31%, constitutes a critical psychosocial risk factor, with no compensatory mechanism identified. This is not a secondary weakness: it is a central and enduring failure at the heart of the organisation.

NONE of the leadership indicators reaches a 50% satisfaction rate, and ALL results are systematically BELOW the EU average, revealing a profound and persistent lack of confidence in the F4E Leadership Team.

These figures speak for themselves. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to see how the leadership can retain any legitimacy, let alone claim any credibility with staff.

Leadership can function either as a risk factor or as a protective factor in the prevention of psychosocial risks. In the present case, the results relating to F4E leadership clearly point to the existence of significant psychosocial risk factors.

And this is, if anything, even more dramatic within the Director’s Department and the ITER Project Department, reaching levels unprecedented in any European institution.

Indeed, in both cases, satisfaction falls to 22%, representing:

• · a 9% gap compared with the F4E average; and
• · a 21% gap compared with the EU average.

From a psychosocial risk prevention perspective, the situation in the Director’s Department and the ITER Project Department must be treated as a priority requiring targeted and immediate action. This is because these are not only two highly important Departments, but also two Departments of strategic importance to the management of F4E as a whole.

Moreover, only 18% of respondents consider that decision-making within the organisation is objective and transparent, a result that is especially concerning from a psychosocial risk prevention perspective

Such results are indicative of a very serious deterioration in social relations and a deficit in the quality of interactions between staff and the Leadership Team.

These are well-established psychosocial risk factors which may generate pathogenic mechanisms such as feelings of professional devaluation, loss of meaning at work and relational insecurity.

Over time, and if left unaddressed, these factors are likely to lead to adverse health outcomes, including chronic stress, burnout and, in some cases, situations of harassment.

In addition, five areas constitute major occupational risk factors and reflect deep-rooted organisational failings:

• 2. Diversity, equity and inclusion (56%)
  • Anti-harassment policy (warning sign)
  • Inclusive environment (requires improvement)
  • Reporting of cases (requires improvement)

• 3. Mission, values and trust (52%)
  • Trust in leadership (warning sign)
  • Leading by example (warning sign)
  • Consideration given to staff views (warning sign)
  • Follow-up to Staff Survey results (warning sign)

• 4. Collaboration (58%)
  • Information-sharing (red flag)
  • Work processes (warning sign)
  • Workload (warning sign)

• 5. Effective working environment (57%)
  • Change management policy (red flag)
  • Processes (warning sign)
  • Workload (warning sign)

• 6. Transparency
  • Objective and transparent decision-making (red flag)
  • Clear vision (requires improvement)
  • Freedom of expression (requires improvement)
  • Social dialogue (requires improvement)

Reorganisation

Furthermore, the results clearly show that the most recent reorganisation has itself generated a number of warning signs, particularly in terms of understanding, effectiveness, and support within the matrix environment.

B. Protective factors

However, four areas may still be regarded as protective factors, although even these remain fragile and require substantial improvement:

• 1. Line manager (68%)

Overall, this remains a protective factor. However, persistent shortcomings remain, particularly in terms of visibility and proximity to staff.

• 2. Enriching and rewarding work (70%)

This remains a protective factor. However, the RPS survey clearly confirms that staff continue to face significant shortcomings in participation in decision-making and in the recognition of their efforts.

• 3. Well-being (66%)

This remains a protective factor. Nevertheless, serious concerns persist in relation to workload and social relations, which continue to undermine staff well-being.

• 4. Training and development (61%)

This also remains a protective factor. However, major weaknesses remain in relation to the development of staff potential and visibility.

IV. R&D’ operational proposals

Addressing the above-mentioned occupational risks requires coherent, cross-cutting corrective measures, including:

• · strengthened leadership accountability,
• · enhanced transparency in decision-making,
• · clearer communication of strategic priorities,
• · and meaningful staff involvement in organisational change.

Without such an integrated approach, there is a high risk that the negative impacts on staff well-being, including stress, burnout and disengagement, will persist or worsen over time.

Furthermore, these risks will also affect the functioning of F4E, impacting organisational performance, service quality, the working environment, and F4E’s commitment to its responsibilities as an employer – specifically regarding the preventive measures that should have been put in place since 2014.

R&D’s analysis shows that the difficulties identified cannot be dismissed as merely cultural or behavioural issues.

They are the consequence of a persistent structural, managerial, and organisational failure.

That is why an exclusively culture-based response is therefore not only insufficient, but fundamentally inappropriate.

Any serious and sustainable response must therefore include a thorough review of F4E:

• · governance
• · work organisation
• · communication
• · workload regulation

R&D calls for a rigorous risk prevention plan to be put in place

In light of the above, and in order to address the risks, failures, and managerial and organisational shortcomings identified, R&D calls for: 

• · the immediate establishment of a rigorous risk prevention plan built on three pillars:
  • – organisational
  • – managerial
  • – staff support, including listening and support mechanisms

• · a workload audit

• · clarification and prioritisation of activities

Conclusion: what is truly at stake is not the presentation of yet another ineffective action plan, but first and foremost the restoration of trust

Let us be clear: the messages repeatedly sent by F4E staff can no longer go unanswered.

Enough communication campaigns. Enough empty action plans. Enough slogans. Enough promises announced and never delivered.

Restoring trust and credibility requires leadership, accountability and effective governance, translated into concrete, measurable and verifiable actions.

This is not a communication issue, but a governance and compliance issue.

Resilience has carried F4E staff a long way. But resilience cannot replace leadership. It cannot replace accountability. And it cannot replace action. The time for visible, concrete and structural change is long overdue

Trust is not restored by tone. Trust is restored only through effective action and visible change.

Cristiano SEBASTIANI

President

Copy:

Mr M. Gil Tertre, Head of Cabinet Vice-President Ribera

Mr G. Radziejewski, Head of Cabinet; Ms A. Carrero, Member of Cabinet of Commissioner Serafin

Mr M. Engell-Rossen, Head of Cabinet of Commissioner Jørgensen

Ms L. Naesager, Chief confidential Counsellor

Ms I. Juhansone, Secretary-General; Mr P. Leardini, Deputy Secretary-General

Ms D. Juul-Joergensen, Director-General; Mr J. Panek, Director “Nuclear energy, safety, and ITER”; Mr M. Coppola DG ENER

Mr M. Huebel, Commission’ representative in the F4E’ Governing Board

Mr M. Lachaise, Director Fusion for Energy (F4E)

Staff

Annex : our communication following the release of the 2025 Staff Satisfaction Survey results at F4E